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 In this paper we examine the association between various types of strategic management actions 
by distressed companies and the likelihood that they receive a going-concern audit opinion. Prior 
going-concern studies that focus on the impact of non-financial information investigate particular 
operating turnaround initiatives, such as cost reduction strategies (see, Behn et al., 2001; and 
Geiger and Rama, 2003). We contribute to this literature by studying the impact of a broader set 
of operating turnaround initiatives (i.e. cost reduction, asset disposal, increased marketing and 
product upgrading), as well as a set of strategic growth initiatives (i.e. product innovation, 
expansion and cooperative strategies).  As the assessment of an auditee’s likelihood of survival 
within the next twelve months is a critical in the going-concern decision making context, we 
further distinguish between strategic growth initiatives that are likely to generate positive cash 
flows in the short run (i.e. cooperative agreements) versus long run (i.e. innovation and expansion 
strategies). Based on manually collected data on a sample of 114 distressed manufacturing US 
firms, we find that operating turnaround initiatives, as well as strategic initiatives that are likely 
to generate positive cash flows in the long run are positively associated with the likelihood that a 
going-concern opinion is received. This evidence suggests that these two categories of 
management initiatives are perceived as additional going-concern risk factors by auditors. On the 
contrary, strategic turnaround initiatives that are likely to generate positive cash flows in the short 
run, are negatively associated with the likelihood that a going-concern opinion is received, which 
is supportive of this category of initiatives being perceived as mitigating factors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this study we investigate whether strategic actions taken by management of financially 
distressed firms affect the auditors’ going-concern opinion decision. Hypothesizing a relationship 
between client strategic actions and going-concern audit decisions is motivated by at least two 
features. First, SAS no. 59 explicitly prescribes the consideration of contrary non-financial 
(internal and external) matters and mitigating management plans in making going-concern 
decisions. Therefore a broad set of events, actions and management plans – including strategic – 
are potential determinants of going-concern opinion decisions. Second, changes in auditing 
methodology and technology towards business risk auditing approaches in the second half of the 
nineties (such as Strategic-Systems Auditing as introduced in Bell et al. 1997 and further 
developed in Bell et al. 2005) further motivate the likelihood that strategic management actions 
are an integrated part of audit evidence collection. Note that client strategic analysis
1 is one of the 
most innovative aspects of business risk auditing methodologies. As the evidence collected from 
strategic analyses is likely to have a substantial impact on subsequently planned and executed 
audit procedures as well as the assessment of a client’s future financial viability, it is also very 
likely to affect the auditor’s going-concern opinion decision.  
It is well documented in the literature that auditors make going-concern decisions based 
on reported financial results and compliance with financial obligations (see, for example, 
Mutchler, 1985 and 1997; Levitan and Knoblett, 1985; Menon and Schwartz, 1987; Dopuch et 
al., 1987; Bell and Tabor, 1991; Chen and Church, 1992; Gaeremynck and Willekens, 2003). The 
importance of information other than that contained in the financial statements is also emphasized 
in SAS no. 59. Besides the presence of negative financial trends and other indications of possible 
financial difficulties – like for example default on loan agreements, SAS No. 59 also defines 
certain (non-financial) internal and external matters as conditions and events that may indicate 
 
1 or stated alternatively, acquiring evidence of and from the entity business states (EBS) as advocated in Bell et al. 
(2005).   3
that there could be substantial doubt about the entity to continue as a going-concern. 
Subsequently, SAS no.59 also requires auditors to consider management plans to mitigate the 
effects of these adverse conditions or events when assessing their client’s ability to continue as a 
going-concern. The impact on the audit opinion of contrary and mitigating factors in publicly 
available disclosures such as the financial press, 10-K’s or management discussions and analyses 
has also been documented in the going-concern literature (see Mutchler et al., 1997). Although 
the importance of strategic management plans is recognized in today’s auditing practice, research 
on the impact of forward-looking management plans on going-concern decisions is scant. Behn et 
al. (2001) recognized this caveat and provide evidence of the relationship between the likelihood 
of going-concern opinions and a company’s ability to obtain new financing and to reduce costs. 
After controlling for financial condition, size, default status, and the propensity to voluntarily 
disclose information, their results indicate that going-concern opinion decisions are strongly 
linked to publicly available mitigating information regarding certain management plans. In 
particular, plans to issue equity and to borrow additional funds exert the strongest association 
with the issuance of an unqualified opinion.  Recently, Geiger and Rama (2003) report that 
companies are more likely to receive a modified report if they entered into a cost reduction plan 
or sold off significant assets. However, contrary to the findings of Behn et al. (2001), plans for 
the issuance of new debt or equity are not significantly associated with the auditor’s opinion type. 
The increased relevance of strategic parameters in the audit decision making context in 
general, is attributable to changes in the scope and methodology of auditing that have taken place 
in (a number of) large accounting firms in the second half of the nineties (see, for example, Bell 
et al. 1997; Lemon, Tatum and Turley 2000; Knechel, 2001; Bell et al. 2005; Curtis and Turley 
2005). Whereas traditional auditing approaches adopt a bottom-up focus thereby directing 
attention to the nature of account balances, classes of transactions, and properties of the client’s 
accounting system, business risk auditing develops a top-down holistic perspective of the client’s   4
                                                
business and industry.  This entails a thorough analysis of the client’s business and strategic 
position. Note that a general evolution towards business risk auditing elements is reflected in 
some of the new International Audit Risk Standards. In particular, International Standard on 
Auditing (ISA) 315 requires the auditor to develop an understanding of client objectives and 
strategies, as well as the related business risks that may result in a material misstatement of the 
financial statements. These business risks should not only be evaluated in light of their immediate 
consequences for the risk of material misstatements, but also with regard to their longer-term 
consequences.  
We contribute to the going-concern literature by testing the association between the 
likelihood of going-concern opinions and a comprehensive set of strategic actions for a sample of 
distressed US manufacturing companies. Like other going-concern studies, we rely on 
information disclosed by management in the management discussion and analysis (MD&A), and 
remainder of the 10-K (Behn et al., 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003). Consistent with the strategy 
literature
2 (see for example, Barker and Duhaime, 1997; Robbins and Pearce II, 1992; 
Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001; Bruton et al. 2003) we distinguish between management actions and 
plans aimed at a short-term improvement in financial performance (or, operating turnaround 
initiatives) and strategic growth initiatives (or, strategic turnaround initiatives). As going-concern 
decision making involves the assessment of the likelihood of survival of an auditee within the 
next twelve months, we further sub-divide strategic growth initiatives in those that are likely to 
generate positive cash flows in the short run (i.e. cooperative agreements) versus long run (i.e. 
innovation and expansion strategies).  
Consistent with prior going-concern studies which focused on short-term improvement 
(or, operating) initiatives (see, Behn et al. 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003), we find that cost 
reduction strategies are positively associated with the likelihood of receiving a going-concern 
 
2 The strategy literature contains an extensive body of research that focuses on how firms reverse firm-threatening 
performance declines. See also hypothesis development section.   5
opinion. In addition, we also find that marketing strategies are positively associated with the 
likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion. Our test of the growth initiatives reveals that the 
engagement in cooperative agreements is negatively associated with the likelihood of receiving a 
going-concern opinion. Our results are consistent with cooperative agreements providing a 
positive signal about the going-concern status of the firm and therefore can be interpreted as a 
mitigating factor, whereas the presence of cost reduction and marketing strategies are perceived 
as additional going-concern risk factors which increase the likelihood to receive a going-concern 
opinion.  
Finally, we also test the impact of three types of aggregated construct variables capturing 
the presence short-term initiatives, strategic growth initiatives  and vvv. We find that more 
operating turnaround initiatives taken by a distressed firm are associated with a higher likelihood 
that a going-concern opinion is issued. A similar result is obtained for strategic initiatives not 
capable of generating short-term financial impact. On the contrary, the presence of strategic 
turnaround initiatives that are likely to generate a financial impact in the short run is negatively 
associated with the likelihood that a going-concern opinion is issued. Thus, our evidence suggests 
that auditors perceive the engagement in operating initiatives and strategic growth initiatives that 
only yield a financial impact in the long term as additional going-concern risk factors, but the 
engagement in strategic growth initiatives that generate a short-term financial impact as a 
mitigating factor. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop our 
hypotheses. Section 3 then is devoted to the development of the going-concern opinion model 
that is tested in this paper. Next, in Section 4 we provide an overview of our sample selection 
procedure and data collection approach. In Section 5 we discuss the results of our analyses. We 
conclude in Section 6.  
   6
2.  HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
SAS no. 59 clearly states that besides financial indicators – such as negative (financial) trends 
and other indications of possible financial difficulties – non-financial internal and external 
matters are relevant conditions and events to assess the going-concern status of a client firm. 
Examples of internal matters that are included in SAS No. 59 are work stoppages or substantial 
dependence on the success of a particular project. External matters listed in SAS No. 59 include, 
for example, legal proceedings or the loss of a key franchise, license or patent. Furthermore, 
when the identified conditions and events in the aggregate lead to substantial doubt about the 
continued existence of the entity as a going-concern, the auditor should identify and evaluate 
management’s plans to mitigate the effects of these adverse conditions or events. If the auditor 
believes that there exist management plans that overcome this substantial doubt, a going-concern 
audit report is not required. Examples of such potentially mitigating management plans are 
included in SAS no.59, and relate to the sale of assets, the borrowing or restructuring of debt, the 
reduction of expenditures and the increase of ownership equity.   
A few prior studies provide evidence that auditors are indeed committed to reviewing 
management plans that are dealing with adverse conditions or events when assessing a client’s 
ability to continue as a going-concern (Behn et al., 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003). However, 
these studies are confined to assessing the impact of examples of management plans and actions 
that are explicitly mentioned in SAS no.59. In this paper, we elaborate on this theme and 
investigate the impact of a broader set of potentially contrary or mitigating actions and strategies 
on the auditor’s going-concern decision. We motivate this broader strategic focus by the 
emergence of business risk auditing in the 1990s. With the emergence of business risk auditing, 
traditional auditing methodologies have been complemented with new audit processes based on a 
top-down, holistic perspective of the client’s business and industry (see, for example, Bell et al. 
1997; Knechel 2001; Lemon, Tatum and Turley 2000). The most innovative aspect of business   7
                                                
risk auditing is the assessment of client strategic viability, which can have a substantial impact on 
the subsequent audit procedures and the assessment of future financial viability.  
To predict the impact of a comprehensive set of viable strategic actions on the going-
concern opinion, we categorize management actions into strategic  and  operating turnaround 
approaches. This is a widely used framework introduced by Hofer (1980). Note that an operating 
approach focuses on internal, operating problems of firms through – for example – decreasing 
costs, increasing efficiency, disposing assets, or improving sales (Hofer, 1980). A strategic 
turnaround approach is aimed at long-term profitability by solving external, strategic problems 
through for example a change in the strategic direction of the firm, its positioning, alliances and 
product lines (Bruton et al., 2003). Strategic repositioning may be done through business 
divestments, acquisitions, alliances, new product development, new markets, and increased 
market penetration. Firms experiencing financial distress may adopt a variety of strategies to 
return to financial health. The strategy literature offers an extensive body of research that focuses 
on how firms reverse firm-threatening performance declines to induce successful company 
turnaround
3 (see for example, Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Robbins and Pearce II, 1992; 
Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001; Bruton et al. 2003).   
 
Hypothesis 1: Operating turnaround approaches and going-concern opinions 
An operating approach to company turnaround typically consists of actions related to cost 
reduction, revenue generation and operating-asset reduction. The focus is on achieving short-term 
financial relief, without considering long-term changes in the organization’s strategy.  In order to 
achieve short-term profitability improvement, companies have the opportunity to engage in 
classic retrenchment activities such as: divestment, product elimination, cost rationalization and 
employee layoffs. In addition to these cost-cutting initiatives, revenue generating strategies may 
 
3 Successful turnaround is defined as the reversal of a firm’s pattern of performance decline (Schendel, Patton and 
Riggs, 1976).    8
                                                
be pursued focusing on existing lines of products, price-cutting, increased marketing expenditure 
or increased direct sales efforts (Hofer, 1980).  
Prior studies that examine the association between the implementation of operating 
approaches and successful company turnaround have focused on retrenchment activities and 
provide mixed results. Several studies report that classic retrenchment strategies are significantly 
associated with turnaround success (see, for example, Robbins and Pearce II, 1992), whereas 
other studies cast doubt on the value of operating approaches as part of a company’s turnaround 
approach (Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001; Barker III and Mone, 1994).  
The mixed evidence from the strategy literature indicates that operating turnaround 
strategies  per se may not be capable of curing deficiencies in a declining firm’s strategic 
orientation. In other words, if a declining firm’s problems relate to its strategic positioning, these 
short-term cures could be inadequate, given that changing a firm’s strategic orientation is a 
prerequisite to recovery (see also Schendel et al., 1976; Hofer, 1980; Barker and Duhaime, 1997). 
As we investigate the auditor’s perception of the effectiveness of operating turnaround 
approaches
4 for distressed firms, a relevant question is which signal such approaches by 
themselves send to the auditor regarding the going-concern status of the company. Given the 
evidence reported above, it is likely that auditors perceive operating turnaround strategies as 
insufficient to induce recovery for distressed firms. This is indeed consistent with the finding 
reported by Geiger and Rama (2003), i.e. that cost-cutting or asset disposal activities are 




4 These include cost-cutting activities, disposal of assets, increasing marketing efforts and improving existing 
products and operating processes – see also Section Model Specification.   9
H1:  For financially distressed companies, the implementation of an operating turnaround 
approach is likely to increase (ceteris paribus) the propensity that a going-concern 
opinion is issued. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Strategic turnaround approaches and going-concern opinions 
Overall, the evidence from the strategy literature suggests that (long-term) strategic turnaround 
approaches are successful turnaround vehicles. Barker III and Duhaime (1997) find that when a 
company’s decline is firm-based and not caused by industry contraction, recovering firms 
implement more extensive strategic changes (which are consistent with reorientation). 
Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) provide evidence that firms recovering from financial distress 
typically adopt more forward-looking, expansionary and external market focused strategies than 
non-recovery firms. More specifically, recovery firms typically adopt growth-oriented and 
external-market focused strategies, whereas non-recovery firms continue to engage in operating 
restructuring strategies. Given the evidence from the strategy literature about the effectiveness of 
strategic approaches for company turnaround and recovery, it is reasonable to expect that such 
strategies may also have a mitigating impact on the auditor’s going-concern opinion. However, as 
the auditor’s going-concern opinion is an assessment of the client’s ability to survive during the 
next 12 months, only those (long-term) strategic approaches that are expected to have a positive 
impact on the company’s liquidity status within the next 12 months will be perceived as 
mitigating factors. It is therefore necessary to further examine the short-term impact of the 
different types of long-term strategic approaches, i.e. cooperative agreements, product innovation 
and acquisition strategies. 
Barker III and Duhaime (1997) emphasize that cooperative agreements with other firms 
are an essential element of a turnaround approach based on strategic change. Examples of 
cooperative strategies include long-term contractual agreements with suppliers or buyers,   10
                                                
alliances or joint ventures, subcontracting and technology licensing agreements
5. Prior research 
about the consequences of the implementation of a cooperative strategy has shown that strategic 
networks such as strategic alliances, joint-ventures and long-term buyer-supplier relationships 
often have positive effects on different measures of corporate performance. For example, 
Mitchell and Singh (1996) reported evidence of alliances raising organisational survival rates. 
Powell et al. (1996) found that companies which had formed many alliances experienced 
accelerated growth rates. Gulati et al. (2000) highlight the idea that one of the most important 
benefits of strategic networks is the increased access to information, resources, markets and 
technologies. In addition to access to resources, Stuart (2000) found that strategic alliances also 
affect firm subsequent-period performance through their influence on an organization’s 
reputation, particularly if the firm is of ambiguous quality. 
Capon et al. (1992) report that new product development and strategic acquisitions are 
often linked to (long-term) performance improvement, and report evidence that suggests that both 
strategies act as substitutes in terms of effectiveness vis-à-vis company turnaround (i.e. non-
innovative firms that involve in acquisitions perform nearly as well as those that engage in 
product innovations). However, the short-term performance impact of both types of strategic 
actions is less apparent. In a recent meta-analytic review of merger and acquisition performance, 
King et al. (2004) report that acquisitions are not improving the short-term financial performance 
of acquiring firms, on average
6. With respect to the short-term performance impact of product 
innovation, Mishina et al. (2004) even report a negative association with the rate of short-term 
sales growth.   
 
5 Note that strategic alliances are a popular financing vehicle for companies in financial distress, as partnering up 
with a successful healthy company can provide distressed companies with additional funding to develop or market 
products, or with other benefits such as a more extensive customer base (see, for example, Bruton et al. 2003). 
Another vehicle to improve financial position is engaging in a licensing strategy with regard to unused or high-risk 
technology. Licensing out proprietary technology can substantially improve a company’s financial position as it 
periodically receives royalties and/or milestone payments (see, for example, Sudarsanam and Lai 2003). A company 
can also safeguard future sales by engaging into long-term contracting with buyers or distributors (Miller, 1992). 
6 Instead, this study indicates that acquisitions either have no significant effect or a modest negative effect on an 
acquiring firm’s financial performance in the post-announcement period.     11
To summarize, the evidence from the strategy literature suggests that (long-term) strategic 
turnaround approaches are successful turnaround vehicles. However, the short-term performance 
impact of different types of strategic turnaround approaches varies. Based on prior research it is 
reasonable to expect that the introduction of new products and corporate acquisitions are less 
likely to have a positive financial impact within the next 12 months, whereas it is more likely that 
cooperative agreements generate positive cash flows within the next 12 months. This leads to our 
second hypothesis: 
 
 H2:   For financially distressed companies the implementation of a strategic turnaround 
approach is likely to reduce (ceteris paribus) the propensity that a going-concern audit 
opinion is issued, given that the strategy is likely to have a mitigating impact within the 
next 12 months. 
 
3.  MODEL SPECIFICATION AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
We use the following logistic model to test our two hypotheses: 
REPORT = f (operating turnaround variables, strategic turnaround variables, control variables).  
REPORT is an indicator variable that takes a value equal to one if the auditor issues a going-
concern report, and zero otherwise. The turnaround approach variables contain information 
regarding turnaround strategies that have been implemented by the company during the year 
under audit to overcome adverse conditions affecting corporate performance. This information is 
manually collected from corporate disclosures in the annual report and 10-K.  We investigate the 
impact of two categories of turnaround strategies that can potentially mitigate the adverse 
conditions affecting company performance.  In the category of operating turnaround strategies, 
we consider the impact of cost-cutting and asset disposal activities, product and operating process   12
improvements and increasing marketing efforts. As strategic turnaround approaches, we consider 
cooperative agreements with other firms, the introduction of new products, mergers, and 
acquisitions.  Finally, the control variables in our model encompass factors that have been found 
to be associated with going-concern opinion decisions and the propensity to voluntarily disclose 
information in prior research.  
[ INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
3.1 Operating turnaround variables 
Our classification of operating turnaround variables is based on Hofer (1980) who distinguishes 
between four different types of operating turnaround approaches: a) cost-cutting strategies, b) 
asset reduction strategies, c) revenue increasing strategies and d) combination strategies. 
Accordingly, we include and test variables reflecting a cost reduction strategy (O-COSTRED), an 
asset disposal strategy (O-DISPOSE), a commercial strategy (O-COMMERCIAL), and a strategy 
aimed at the improvement of existing products and processes (O-UPGRAD).  
We define O-COSTRED as an operating turnaround variable that captures significant cost 
reduction efforts. In particular, this variable relates to both employee layoffs and other cost 
reduction efforts during the year under audit. O-COSTRED is set equal to one if the company 
reports cost reduction strategies for the year under audit, and is set equal to zero otherwise. O-
DISPOSE is defined as an operating turnaround variable that indicates whether a company 
engages in the sale of significant assets. O-DISPOSE is set equal to one if the company reports 
the sale of assets for the year under audit, and is set equal to zero otherwise. As opposed to 
strategic actions aimed at reducing expenditures, short-term operating strategies also include a 
number of revenue generating activities (Hofer, 1980). Subsequently, we define O-  13
COMMERCIAL as an operating turnaround variable that indicates whether a company increases 
its marketing efforts, and O-UPGRAD as a variable that relates to the realisation of 
improvements in existing products and production processes.  O-COMMERCIAL is set equal to 
one if the company reports increased marketing efforts for the year under audit, and is set equal to 
zero otherwise. O-UPGRADE is set equal to one if the company reports product and/or process 
improvements for the year under audit, and is set equal to zero otherwise. In order to extend and 
refine our analyses, we also define a number of strategic construct variables. This will enable us 
to test the aggregate impact of strategic turnaround variables that have similar characteristics on 
theoretical grounds. OPERATING is defined as the sum of O-COSTRED, O-DISPOSE, O-
COMMERCIAL and O-UPGRADE, scaled by its maximum value in the sample.  Note that a 
further refinement in short-term versus long-term impact variables would be tautological in the 
context of operating initiatives, as they are all expected to have a short-term impact on financial 
performance.  
  
3.2 Strategic turnaround variables 
Long-term strategic turnaround approaches typically relate to reconfiguration of the assets 
and/or the corporate portfolio, and product and/or market refocusing. S-EXPANSION is a 
strategic turnaround variable capturing whether a company engages in an acquisition strategy (of 
other companies) to accelerate growth.  S-EXPANSION is set equal to one if the company 
reports acquisitions for the year under audit, and is set equal to zero if such is not the case. We 
also include S-COOP, a variable that indicates whether a company enters into strategic alliances, 
joint-ventures, licensing agreements and other cooperative arrangements. S-COOP is set equal to 
one if a company entered in cooperative arrangements during the year under audit, and is set 
equal to zero if such is not the case. Further, we define S-PRODUCT as a strategic turnaround 
variable that assesses whether a company has recently introduced new products.  S-PRODUCT is   14
set equal to one if the company reports the introduction of new products during the year under 
audit, and is set equal to zero if such is not the case.  
Finally, we also introduce strategic construct variables to capture the aggregate impact of 
several strategic turnaround initiatives engaged in by the audited firm. First, we define a (rough) 
strategic construct variable STRATEGIC to capture the aggregate impact of all strategic 
turnaround initiatives that have been implemented by the audited company during the past year. 
This categorization is based on the strategic literature (see, Hofer, 1980). STRATEGIC is a 
discrete variable representing the sum of all strategic turnaround variables defined above, scaled 
by its maximum value in the sample. In a more refined categorization of strategic variables, we 
distinguish between strategic initiatives that are expected to have a positive impact on firm 
financial performance in the short term (STRAT_ST) or in the long term (STRAT_LT). This 
categorization can be motivated by recent evidence in the strategy literature (see, King et al. 
2004; Mishina et al. 2004) that acquisitions and product innovations are not improving the short-
term financial performance of acquiring and innovating firms, respectively. Such a distinction in 
short-term and long-term financial impact is warranted given the going-concern decision context 
that we are investigating. STRAT_ST is an indicator variable which happens to coincide with S-
COOP, as the presence of cooperative agreements is the only strategic turnaround variable 
defined in this paper that is likely to generate a financial impact within the next twelve months. 
STRAT_LT is defined as the sum of S-PRODUCTS and S-ACQUIS, divided by its maximum 
value in the sample.  We also refer to Table 1, for an overview of definitions of the strategic 
variables. 
 
3.3 Control variables 
The issuance of a going-concern opinion is obviously conditional upon the auditee’s financial 
condition. Therefore a first category of control variables that are included in our model capture   15
                                                
the financial condition of the firm. Based on prior audit opinion studies (see, for example, 
Mutchler 1985, 1997; Chen and Church, 1992) we include cash flow from operations divided by 
total liabilities (CFO/TL), the current ratio (CR), and long-term debt divided by total assets 
(LTD/TA), as control variables. Following Menon and Schwartz (1987), we also include a 
change variable, namely the change in current ratio (∆CR). In line with Bell and Tabor (1991), 
we also control for a company’s liquidity performance relative to the industry, by including an 
indicator variable (INDCR), taking the value of one if the current ratio of the company exceeds 
the industry median current ratio. As in Chen and Church (1992), we also add DEFAULT, an 
indicator variable that takes a value equal to one if the company defaults on debt payments or is 
in technical default of loan covenants
7, and zero otherwise. Following prior research, we also 
include the log of total assets to control for company size (see, for example, Chen and Church, 
1992).   
A second category of control variables constitute mitigating factors identified in prior 
audit opinion research. Behn et al. (2001) find that plans to use existing bank lines of credit and 
other approved lines of credit are negatively associated with the likelihood of a going-concern 
opinion. Consistent with Behn et al. (2001) we include BORROW, a variable that is set equal to 
one if the auditee plans to borrow funds through existing bank lines of credit or other approved 
debt instruments; and STOCK, a variable that is set equal to one if the auditee plans to issue 
equity through existing or committed arrangements.  
 
4. SAMPLE AND DATA  
4.1  Sample selection 
Consistent with prior going-concern studies (see, for example, Mutchler, 1985; Chen and Church, 
1992; and Behn et al., 2001) we select a sample adopting a matched pair design. Note that a 
 
7 A company’s default status was determined by reading the MD&A and debt footnotes in the financial statements.   16
matched pair design is most often used when the research design necessitates manual data 
collection, as is the case in this study. In particular, we first selected a sample of companies that 
received a first-time going-concern opinion and then a matched sample of distressed companies 
that did not receive a going-concern opinion.  
 
Selection of going-concern firms 
We identified all firms from the Worldscope database that are listed on AMEX, NASDAQ and 
NYSE and received a going-concern audit opinion in the period 1998-2001.  Consistent with 
prior studies (Mutchler and Williams 1990; Behn et al. 2001; Blay and Geiger 2001), we 
restricted our sample to companies in the manufacturing industries (SIC 20 to 39) to eliminate 
confounding industry effects. This resulted in an initial sample of 276 manufacturing companies 
that received a going-concern audit opinion in fiscal years from 1998-2001. From this initial 
sample, we then eliminated companies that received a going-concern report in the previous year 
to control for potential confounding effects from prior going-concern opinions (see also, 
Mutchler, 1985, Blay & Geiger, 2001; Behn et al., 2001). In addition, we also excluded firms that 
faced bankruptcy proceedings as the decision to issue a going-concern opinion is trivial for such 
firms, and firms for which no match could be identified. This resulted in 57 firms with going-
concern opinions: 8 firms in 1998, 8 firms in 1999, 15 firms in 2000, and 26 firms in 2001.  
 
Selection of control firms 
To test our going-concern model, we matched the going-concern sample with a sample of 
distressed companies that did not receive a going-concern report. We searched the Worldscope 
database from 1998 to 2001 to identify all manufacturing companies listed on NASDAQ, NYSE 
or AMEX that received a clean audit opinion. Consistent with prior studies, we further restricted 
the control sample to firms in financial distress (see, for example, Mutchler, 1985; Chen &   17
Church, 1992; Behn et al., 2001; McKeown et al., 1991). Based on Chen and Church (1992) we 
adopt the following criteria to identify distressed companies:  1) negative retained earnings, 2) 
negative operating income, 3) negative net income ,  4) negative working capital, 5) negative net 
worth, and 6) negative operating cash flows. Note that Chen and Church (1992) classified a 
company as stressed if it meets at least one of above criteria. We use a more stringent rule for 
financial distress, by classifying a company to be stressed if it meets at least two of these stress 
criteria. This procedure yielded 2929 “distressed” companies that received a clean opinion during 
the period 1998-2001. 
As we use a matched-pair design, we matched control-sample companies to the going-
concern firms based on year, size (proxied by total assets) and two-digit SIC classifications. This 
procedure ensures that we include similar companies with respect to size and industry in both 
sub-samples.  A matched group design has been used previously by Mutchler (1985), Chen and 
Church (1992), Behn et al. (2001) and Geiger and Rama (2003). A limitation of this approach is 
that it overstates the issuance of a going-concern opinion in this experimental setting. Note that 
we address this issue by our statistical approach, as we adopt logistic regression analysis (see 
further). 
[ INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ] 
4.2  Data collection and strategic scorecard 
As strategic company information is not publicly available, we manually collected this 
information from the relevant 10-Ks filed with the SEC, by reading these documents back-to-
cover and completing a strategic scorecard. The strategic scorecard used to test our hypotheses is 
included in Appendix A. For each of the defined turnaround approaches we assessed whether the 
company has engaged in actions related to that specific turnaround initiative during the year   18
under audit. Per initiative, a score equal to one is assigned if a firm discloses such action, and 
zero otherwise. 
The suitability of 10-K filings for strategic information collection is supported by prior 
studies that investigated the association between disclosures in the MD&A and future corporate 
financial performance. These studies report evidence that indicates that the information content of 
narrative disclosures in the annual report is significantly associated with future viability of 
distressed firms (see, for example, Tennyson et al., 1990; Boo and Simnett, 2002). Boo and 
Simnett (2002) examine the reliability of management’s prospective comments for a sample of 
140 Australian public companies that had experienced significant losses. Their results indicate 
that management’s prospective comments have significant information content with respect to the 
company’s future viability. Note also that SAS No. 8 requires auditors to ensure that the ‘other 
information’ attached to financial statements is not materially inconsistent with the financial 
statements, and does not contain any material misstatement or fact. Furthermore, the costs of 
potential litigation and loss of reputation are important factors to prevent management from 
disclosing misleading information. 
Note that the dependent variable and (most of) the control variables in the model are 
collected from the WORLDSCOPE data base. The information regarding management's plans to 
engage in additional borrowings and equity issues is also retrieved from 10K’s.  
 
5.  RESULTS  
5.1  Descriptive statistics and univariate results 
Tables 3 and 4 contain the descriptive statistics for the test and control variables. The descriptive 
statistics in Table 3 relate to the full sample (of distressed companies), whereas the descriptive   19
statistics in Table 4 are given for the going-concern and non-going concern samples separately. 
Table 4 also reports the results of a t-test of differences between the going-concern and non-going 
concern samples. Inspection of Table 3 reveals that the most common turnaround approaches in 
our (full) sample of distressed firms are the cost reduction strategy (O-COSTRED,  appearing in 
60% of the sample firms) and the cooperative strategy (S-COOP, appearing in 61% of the sample 
firms). All other approaches only occur in between 15 and 34 percent of the sample firms.  
The results in Table 4 indicate that the companies that received a going-concern audit 
report have a significantly lower current ratio (CR, t-statistic = 2.84), are more likely to have a 
lower current ratio than the industry average value (INDCR, t-statistic = 4.83), are less likely to 
be in default (DEFAULT, t-statistic = 3.71) and engage less frequently in additional borrowings 
(BORROWING, t-statistic = 5.38). These results are consistent with going-concern opinions 
being issued for distressed companies that face short term liquidity problems. Note that the non-
significant differences between the two samples with respect to the other financial distress 
variables (other than liquidity measures) and total assets are supporting the efficacy of our 
matching procedures.   
Only a few turnaround activities appear to be significantly different for going-concern and 
non-going concern companies. The strongest result is found for cost-cutting activities which are 
significantly more common in the sample of going-concern firms (O-COSTRED, t-statistic = 
1.92).  The aggregate OPERATING variable is also (weakly) significantly higher for the going-
concern sample (OPERATING, t-statistic = 1.98). The occurrence of (long-term) strategic 
activities is not significantly different between going-concern and non-going concern firms.  
 
[ INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ]   20
5.2  Multivariate logistic analysis 
To test our hypotheses and assess which (type) strategic and operating variables are significantly 
different between going-concern and other firms we estimate four logistic regression models. Our 
choice of logistic regression analysis (instead of a probit analysis) is inspired by the matched 
sampling approach we adopt. The use of logistic regression analysis neutralizes potential 
problems resulting from oversampling going-concern companies relative to the population 
proportion.  In logistic regression analysis the coefficients of the independent variables will not 
be affected by disproportionate sampling, only the intercept term is affected. However, since we 
are not obtaining parameter estimates for the purpose of developing a predictive model, the bias 
in the intercept term has no effect on our analysis (Maddala, 1991). We further also tested 
whether there are multicollinearity problems between the independent variables that may affect 
our results. Inspection of the correlation matrix (see Appendix B) indicates that most correlations 
between the independent variables are below 30 percent. As there are some larger correlations, 
we also calculated VIF factors, but all VIF scores are below 4.11.   
  We report the results from our multivariate logistic analyses in Tables 5 and 6. We 
estimate four models. Model 1 is estimated to establish a base model for going-concern opinions 
based on prior audit opinion studies, and thus mainly includes financial health variables and 
variables that capture the ability to engage in additional borrowings and stock issues. Models 2, 3 
and 4 are estimated to test our hypotheses and assess which (types of) strategic and operating 
variables have incremental explanatory power beyond the control variables.  
 
[ INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
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Model 1 has good explanatory power with a chi-square statistic equal to 66.44, a pseudo 
R
2 equal to 57% and a McFadden R² equal to 42%. Only the current ratio (CR, p < 0.05), the 
company’s current ratio relative to the industry (IND_CR, p < 0.05) operating cash flow over 
total liabilities (CFOTL, p < 0.01), DEFAULT (p<0.01) and BORROW  (p <0.01) are significant 
in a multivariate setting. These results indicate that in a distressed firms’ context, poor liquidity is 
positively associated with the likelihood to receive a going-concern opinion, whereas the ability 
of a firm to enter in new borrowings is a mitigating factor. Note again that lack of significance of 
the other financial variables illustrates the efficacy of our matching procedures. 
We estimate Model 2 in order to investigate the incremental explanatory power of all 
defined operating and strategic initiatives (see Table 1 for their definitions). Including the 
individual strategic and operating variables in the going-concern model improves the model’s 
explanatory power, with a model chi-square equal to 79.90 (instead of 66.44 for Model 1), a 
pseudo R² equal to 62% (instead of 57% for Model 1) and a McFadden R² equal to 51% (instead 
of 42% for Model 1). Of the four turnaround variables that capture operating initiatives, the cost 
cutting variable (O-COSTRED, p=0.07) is positively and significantly associated with the 
likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion. This result is consistent with the evidence in 
Behn et al. (2001) and Geiger and Rama (2003). The analysis further indicates that increased 
marketing (O-COMMERCIAL, p=0.04, two sided) and upgrading (O-UPGRADE, p=0.14, two 
sided) yield a similar positive result, indicating that these operating activities increase the 
likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion.  These findings are consistent with our first 
hypothesis, stating that operating turnaround strategies do not function as mitigating factors in an 
audit opinion decision context, but rather reinforce the signal that the company faces going-
concern problems. This is consistent with evidence from the strategy literature that companies 
that only implement operating turnaround actions without implementing (subsequently) strategic   22
turnaround actions have a lower survival chance (Sudarsanam en Lai, 2001). Finally, we do not 
find a significant result for O-DISPOSE. 
Of the three defined strategic turnaround variables only S-COOP is significantly 
negatively associated with the likelihood to receive a going-concern opinion (S-COOP, p<0.05). 
This result is consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 2, and indicates that companies that 
entered into cooperative agreements with other firms during the year under audit are less likely to 
receive a going-concern audit report. This also implies that the presence of cooperative 
agreements is seen as a positive turnaround signal by the auditor (with favourable liquidity effects 
already in the next 12 months) and hence can be considered as a mitigating factor. This result is 
not surprising, as prior research has shown that strategic networks often have positive effects on 
corporate performance through access to resources and its influence on corporate reputation 
(Mitchell and Singh, 1996; Powell et al., 1996; Stuart, 2000).  
The other two strategic variables, namely the introduction of new products (S-
PRODUCTS, p = 0.22), and the growth through mergers and acquisitions (S-EXPAND, p=0.23) 
are (by themselves) not significantly associated with the likelihood of receiving a going-concern 
opinion. This can be explained by the fact that, in a distressed firm context, the presence of 
recently undertaken long-term strategic actions such as the introduction of new products and the 
acquisition of another company may be perceived as very risky actions for which the outcome is 
uncertain. As evidenced by prior research (King et al. 2004) it is not very likely that an 
acquisition improves liquidity in the next twelve months. Similarly, it is not very likely that the 
introduction of new products leads to massive positive cash flows in the first year. Note that 
Mishina et al. (2004) even report a negative association between product innovation and short 
term financial performance.  
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In Table 6 we report the results of estimating two additional models based on 
aggregations of the individual operating and strategic initiatives into strategic construct variables 
(see measurement section). In Model 3 we test two construct variables based on Hofer’s (1980) 
classification, i.e. OPERATING and STRATEGIC, reflecting aggregate measures for the 
engagement in either operating or strategic activities. In Model 4, we disaggregate the 
STRATEGIC construct by distinguishing between strategic actions (growth initiatives) that are 
likely to have an impact on financial performance in the short-term (STRAT_ST), and those 
likely to have an impact in the long-term (STRAT_LT). We believe that this refined 
categorization is warranted given the going-concern opinion context in which we study strategic 
actions, as well as recent findings in the strategy literature (King et al., 2004; Mishina et al. 2004) 
that indicate that some strategic actions do not have a short-term effect on financial performance.  
The explanatory power of Model 3 is comparable to that of the base model (Model 1) and 
much weaker compared to Model 2, with a chi-squared equal to 60.61, pseudo R² equal to 58% 
and a McFadden R² equal to 44%. Including the two (rough) construct variables thus adds no 
significant explanatory power to the going-concern model. This indeed suggests that a more 
detailed analysis, as in Model 4, is warranted. The explanatory power of Model 4 clearly 
outperforms Models 1 and 3, with a model chi-square of 76.67 and a McFadden R
2 equal to 61%.  
Estimation of Model 4 yields significant results for all three strategic constructs, i.e. 
OPERATING (p = 0.0256), STRAT_ST (p=0.0485) and STRAT_LT (p = 0,0413). The results 
support our first hypothesis that operating initiatives do not have a mitigating impact on the 
going-concern decision. More specifically, the implementation of operating initiatives sends a 
negative signal to the auditor and significantly increases the likelihood of a going-concern report, 
as the OPERATING construct has a positive coefficient. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, results 
further indicate that strategic initiatives with a short-term financial impact serve as a mitigating 
factor, as STRAT_ST has a negative coefficient. Our evidence also suggests that strategic   24
initiatives with a long-term financial impact have no mitigating impact on the going-concern 
decision. On the contrary, our results suggest that such long-term strategic actions are perceived 
by the auditor as a going-concern risk factor, as they are positively associated with the likelihood 
that a going-concern modified audit report is issued.   As evidenced by prior research, it is not 
very likely that acquisitions and new products improve liquidity in the next twelve months. 
Moreover, acquisitions and mergers are high-risk activities that should be carefully managed in 
order to create value, especially in a distressed firms’ context.  
Overall, the evidence that we present suggests that the inclusion of variables that capture 
operating and strategic turnaround initiatives enhances the explanatory power of going-concern 
opinion models for distressed firms. Also, the results indicate that the presence of cost reduction 
strategies or increased marketing efforts are perceived as additional going-concern risk factors as 
they increase the likelihood to receive a going-concern opinion, whereas cooperative agreements 
provide positive signals about the going-concern status of the firm and therefore can be 
interpreted as a mitigating factor. All other turnaround variables (both strategic and operating) by 
themselves have a positive but insignificant sign. When we test aggregated constructs of 
operating and strategic variables with similar features, we find that the presence of operating 
turnaround initiatives as well as the presence of strategic initiatives that are only likely to 
generate a long-term financial impact are positively associated with the likelihood to receive a 
going-concern opinion, whereas the presence of strategic turnaround initiatives that generate a 
financial impact in the short term are negatively associated with the likelihood to receive a going-
concern opinion. Our evidence suggests that auditors perceive the engagement in operating 
initiatives and strategic growth initiatives that only yield a financial impact in the long term as 
additional going-concern risk factors, but the presence of strategic growth initiatives that generate 
a short-term financial impact as a mitigating factor. 
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5.3  Supplementary analyses 
Since the operating and strategic turnaround variables are derived from client disclosures, we also 
re-ran the models including a set of variables that control for potential systematic differences 
amongst firms in making voluntary disclosures. By doing this, we aim to ensure that the 
operating and strategic test variables capture a firm’s strategic performance instead of its general 
propensity to disclose corporate information. Botosan (1997) reports that four firm characteristics 
are significantly positively correlated with the propensity to disclose, namely: exchange listing 
status, firm size, audit-firm size, and leverage. Note that firm size and leverage are already 
included in our model specifications given their previously mentioned association with going-
concern audit reports (see supra). As far as exchange listing status is concerned, prior studies 
(see, for example, Branson et al. 1998) find that there is typically less information provided by 
NASDAQ firms as opposed to NYSE/AMEX firms. We reran our model including two 
additional indicator variables: First, EXCHANGE that takes a value equal to one if the firm is 
traded on NASDAQ, and zero otherwise; second, AUDITOR, which is an indicator variable that 
takes a value equal to one if the auditor is a big four/five audit firm. The results show that 
including these two additional control variables (EXCHANGE and BIG5) in Model 2 did not add 
significant explanatory power (p = 0.95 and p = 0.35) and the other results remained largely 
unchanged. 
Rosman, Seol and Biggs (1999) report that an auditor’s consideration of non-financial 
information in a going-concern task differs between start-up and mature companies. We 
performed several analyses to ensure that our results are not driven by company age. Univarariate 
analyses of company age (AGE) across both the experimental and control samples indicate that 
there is no difference between going-concern and non-going-concern firms (p = 1.00) regarding 
age. Including AGE in our test models does not change the significance levels of the other 
variables. We also assessed possible interaction effects of AGE with the seven strategic variables   26
defined in this study. The results of this analysis indicates that marketing efforts (p = 0.087) and 
the introduction of new products (p = 0.007) have a less negative impact on the going-concern 
decision if the company under audit is mature.  
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this study we examine the impact of a broad range of operating and strategic turnaround 
initiatives on the likelihood that an auditor issues a going-concern audit opinion. We analyse 
whether these turnaround activities are functioning as mitigating factors or as going-concern risk 
factors. Prior studies that assess the impact of management plans on going-concern decisions 
(see, for example, Behn et al., 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003) look at forward-looking plans 
relating to retrenchment activities and future financing. In this study, we investigate a more 
comprehensive set of strategic and operating actions. Consistent with the strategy literature, we 
classify strategic actions into (short-term) operating versus (long-term) strategic turnaround 
approaches. Based on the mixed results in the strategy literature regarding the effectiveness of 
short-term operating turnaround initiatives and recent going-concern research by Behn et al. 
(2001) and Geiger and Rama (2003), we hypothesize that such activities are perceived as going-
concern risk factors that increase the likelihood of receiving a going-concern audit report 
(Hypothesis 1). Based on the findings in the strategy literature, we further argue and hypothesize 
that strategic approaches are likely to be negatively associated with the incidence of a going-
concern opinion or in other words that they have the ability to function as mitigating factors 
(Hypothesis 2). However, given the going-concern decision-making context we expect such 
strategies only to be significant if they are capable of generating a financial impact within the 
next twelve months. We find indeed that the presence of cost reduction and marketing strategies 
are perceived as additional going-concern risk factors and increase the likelihood to receive a 
going-concern opinion, whereas cooperative agreements provide positive signals about the going-
concern status of the firm and therefore can be interpreted as a mitigating factor. Most (3 out of 
four) other turnaround variables (both operating and strategic) are positively associated with 
going-concern opinions, but are not significant.    28
In addition to testing the impact of individual operating and strategic initiatives, we 
extended our analysis by testing aggregated constructs of operating and strategic variables that 
have similar features. We identify three different constructs: operating initiatives, strategic 
turnaround initiatives that are not capable of generating a financial impact in the short run (but 
are expected to do so in the long run), and strategic turnaround initiatives that are capable of 
generating a financial impact in the short run.  We find that more operating turnaround initiatives 
taken by a distressed firm are associated with a higher likelihood that a going-concern opinion is 
issued. A similar result is obtained for strategic initiatives not capable of generating short-term 
financial impact. On the contrary, the presence of strategic turnaround initiatives that are likely to 
generate a financial impact in the short run is negatively associated with the likelihood that a 
going-concern opinion is issued. Thus, our evidence suggests that auditors perceive the 
engagement in operating initiatives and strategic growth initiatives that only yield a financial 
impact in the long term as additional going-concern risk factors, but the engagement in strategic 
growth initiatives that generate a short-term financial impact as a mitigating factor. 
This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, due to the manual collection of the 
strategic variables the sample size in this paper is kept rather small (n=114). Further, only 
companies from manufacturing industries are included in the sample. Third, we use the disclosure 
of strategic plans and information in the annual report and 10-K as our proxy of client strategic 
activity. However, clients may disclose strategic plans directly to the auditor without actually 
disclosing them in the 10-Ks. Furthermore, we do not actually measure the feasibility of the 
publicly disclosed strategic plans.   
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TABLE 1: Variable definitions, model specification and expected signs 
 
  Definition  Expected Sign
Dependent variable    
    REPORT  1 if going-concern report issued, 0 otherwise   
    
Independent variables    
  Operating approach    
O-COSTRED  1 if the company reports cost reducing activities for the year 
under audit, 0 otherwise 
+ 
O-DISPOSE  1 if the company reports the sale of assets for the year under 
audit, 0 otherwise 
+ 
O-COMMERCIAL  1 if the company reports increased marketing efforts for the year 
under audit, 0 otherwise 
+ 
O-UPGRAD  1 if whether the company reports product and/or process 
improvements for the year under audit, 0 otherwise 
+ 
OPERATING   Discrete variable representing the sum of all operating initiatives,    + 
  scaled by its maximum value in the sample   
  Strategic approach    
S-EXPANSION  1 if the company reports acquisitions for the year under audit, 0 
otherwise 
+ 
S-COOP  1 if the company entered in cooperative arrangements for the year 
under audit, 0 otherwise 
- 
S-PRODUCT  1 if the company reports the introduction of new products for the 
year under audit, 0 otherwise 
+ 
STRAT_ST  Dummy variable, coded one if the company undertakes strategic 
initiatives with a short-term impact (S-COOP)  
_ 
STRAT_LT  A score from 0 to 2, scaled by its maximum value in the sample, 
representing the sum of all strategic initiatives with a long-term 
impact (S-EXPANSION, S-PRODUCTS)  
+ 
    
  Control variables    
CR Current  ratio  - 
LTDTA  Long term debt/ total assets  + 
LNTA  Natural log of total assets  - 
CFOTL  Cash flow from operations/total liabilities  - 
INDCR  1 if company CR exceeds industry median, 0 otherwise  + 
CHANGECR  One year change in current ratio  + 
DEFAULT  1 if in payment default or technical default of loan covenants, 0 
otherwise 
+ 
STOCK  1 if the company plans to sell a significant amount of equity, 0 
otherwise 
- 
BORROW  1 if the company plans to rely on existing loans and credit 
agreements, 0 otherwise 
-   34




Industry name  Number of 
Companies 
20  Food and Kindred Products  6 
27  Printing and Publishing  2 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  32 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products  2 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  2 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  2 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  10 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  26 
37 Transportation  Equipment  10 
38  Instruments and Related Products  20 
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TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics for entire matched sample of distressed companies 
 







   Operating approach       
O-COSTRED  0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
O-DISPOSE  0.31 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
O-COMMERCIAL  0.27 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
O-UPGRAD  0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
OPERATING  0.35 0.25 0.23 0.00 1.00 
       
   Strategic Approach            
S-EXPANSION  0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
S-COOP  0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
S-PRODUCT  0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
STRAT_ST  0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
STRAT_LT  0.24 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
       
Control  variables       
CR  3.27 1.75 5.46 0.21  45.45 
LTDTA  0.13 0.02 0.28 0.00 1.97 
LNTA  10.34  9.83 1.55 7.06  14.56 
CFOTL  -1.55 -0.32  3.27 -25.82 1.28 
INDCR  0.31 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
CHANGECR  -0.65 -0.49 4.66 -14.48  31.83 
DEFAULT  0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
STOCK  0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
BORROW  0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00   36
TABLE 4: Univariate tests of differences between going-concern firms and non-going concern firms  
 
  Non-Going-Concern sample  Going-concern sample  Test of difference 
  Mean  Std. dev.  Mean   Std. dev.  (t-statisitc) 
 
Operating approach        
O-COSTRED  0.50 0.50 0.70 0.46  2.14** 
O-DISPOSE  0.27 0.45 0.36 0.48  1.01 
O-COMMERCIAL 0.25  0.44 0.29 0.46  0.42 
O-UPGRAD  0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41  0.23 
OPERATING  0.30 0.23 0.39 0.22  1.99** 
 
Strategic Approach        
S-EXPANSION  0.11 0.31 0.20 0.40  1.32 
S-COOP  0.66 0.48 0.54 0.50  1.35 
S-PRODUCT  0.29 0.46 0.38 0.49  1.00 
STRAT_ST  0.66 0.48 0.54 0.50  1.35 
STRAT_LT  0.20 0.28 0.29 0.30  1.63 
   Control variables        
CR  4.72 6.98 1.81 2.67 2.91*** 
LTDTA  0.10 0.16 0.15 0.36  1.02 
LNTA  10.35 1.52 10.33 1.59  0.05 
CFOTL  -1.58 3.84 -1.52 2.61  0.10 
INDCR  0.52 0.50 0.11 0.31 5.18*** 
CHANGECR  0.12 5.74 -1.42 3.12  1.76* 
DEFAULT  0.20 0.40 0.52 0.50 3.73*** 
STOCK  0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33  0.00 
BORROW  0.48 0.50 0.07 0.26 5.42*** 
*      indicates significance at the .10 level (two-tailed) 
**    indicates significance at the .05 level (two-tailed) 
***  indicates significance at the .01 level (two-tailed) 
  TABLE 5: Logistic regression estimates for Models 1, 2 and 3  
 
Variables Predicted sign  Model 1    Model 2                                   Model 3 
    coeff  χ 
2  p-value    coeff  χ 
2  p-value    coeff  χ 
2  p-value 
                    
C    -3.78 2.13 0.1441   -7.57 2.75  0.0975   -4.66 1.69 0.193
CR  -  -0.88 7.67 0.0056   -1.82 12.65  0.0004   -1.29 11.50 0.0007
LTDTA  +  0.95 0.51 0.4747   -0.93 0.14  0.7067   0.56 0.09 0.7661
LNTA  -  0.42 2.87 0.0905   0.63 2.37  0.1238   0.38 1.34 0.2464
CFOTL  -  -1.42 14.58 0.0001   -2.92 14.76  0.0001   -2.13 15.72 <.0001
INDCR  -  -3.08 6.91 0.0086   -8.06 11.33  0.0008   -5.60 11.86 0.0006
CHANGECR  -  -0.01 0.02 0.8933   0.12 0.70  0.4016   0.01 0.01 0.9113
DEFAULT  +  2.11 8.84 0.0029   3.54 8.45  0.0036   2.31 6.53 0.0106
STOCK  -  -0.13 0.02 0.8802   -0.48 0.17  0.6786   -0.67 0.41 0.5204
BORROW  -  -2.58 8.47 0.0036   -3.96 9.89  0.0017   -3.05 7.73 0.0054
O-COSTRED  +                3.22 7.27  0.0070
O-DISPOSE  +                0.93 0.75  0.3874
O-UPGRAD  +            1.05 1.29  0.2553    
O-COMMERCIAL  +              4.56 7.83  0.0051  
S-COOP  -                -2.45 4.07  0.0437
S-EXPAND  +              1.88 2.31  0.1287  
S-PRODUCT  +              1.70 2.77  0.0962  
OPERATING                  6.51 7.36 0.0067
STRATST                 -1.95 4.03 0.0448
STRATLT                 4.09 6.68 0.0097
                      
Pseudo R
2                     0.61 0.67 0.66
McFadden R
2                     0.51 0.67 0.62
Model χ 
2      79.28                 103.84 95.65
                      
p-values are from two-sided tests. 
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APPENDIX B: Correlation matrix 
 
               REPORT CR  LTDTA LNTA  CFOTL INDCR CHANGECR  DEFAULT STOCK BORROW  O-COSTRED O-DISPOSE
REPORT
 
         
                   
                     
                 
                         
                         
                   
                       
           
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                       
                         
                 
                         
                       
             
1.00           
CR -0.27 1.00
LTDTA 0.10 -0.16  1.00
LNTA 0.00  -0.25  0.17  1.00 
CFOTL 0.01 -0.77 0.19 0.39 1.00





-0.17 0.61 0.00  -0.06  -0.45 0.12 1.00
DEFAULT 0.34 -0.25 0.15 0.27 0.26 -0.18 -0.01 1.00
STOCK 0.00  -0.07  -0.06  -0.09  0.05  -0.08  -0.06 -0.06  1.00
BORROW -0.46 0.03 -0.02 0.24 0.16 0.31 -0.03 -0.17 -0.05 1.00
O-COSTRED 0.20 -0.07 0.14 0.25 0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.31 -0.02 -0.10 1.00
O-DISPOSE 0.10 -0.22 0.08 0.26 0.21 -0.12 0.00 0.34 0.15 -0.03 0.12 1.00
O-UPGRAD 0.02 -0.08 0.14 0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.03 0.08 0.14 -0.02 0.10 -0.01
O-COMMERCIAL
 
0.04 0.16 0.18 -0.23 -0.21 0.16 0.10 -0.07 0.14 -0.01 -0.04 -0.19
S-COOP -0.13 0.06 -0.01 -0.23 -0.11 0.04 0.10 -0.07 0.20 -0.06 0.03 -0.19
S-EXPANSION 0.12 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.20 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.02
S-PRODUCT 0.09  -0.03  0.06  -0.04  0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.10 0.03 -0.10
OPERATING
 
0.19 -0.11 0.27 0.16 0.08 -0.01 0.09 0.34 0.20 -0.09 0.63 0.48
STRAT_ST -0.13 0.06 -0.01 -0.23 -0.11 0.04 0.10 -0.07 0.20 -0.06 0.03 -0.19
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 O-UPGRAD  O-COMMERCIAL  S-COOP  S-EXPANSION  S-PRODUCT  OPERATING  STRATST  STRATLT
REPORT 
               
                
                
               
              
                
                
                
              
                
                
             
                 
               
                
                
                 
               
             
















S-COOP 0.19 0.21 1.00
S-EXPANSION 0.03 -0.03 0.09 1.00
S-PRODUCT 0.02 0.22 0.23 -0.03 1.00
OPERATING 0.51 0.39 0.11 -0.01 0.08 1.00
STRAT_ST 0.19 0.21 1.00 0.09 0.23 0.11 1.00
STRAT_LT 0.03 0.16 0.24 0.59 0.79 0.06 0.24  1.00
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Appendix A: Strategic Scorecard 
 
Operating Turnaround Initiatives   
    
  Asset Disposal Strategy   
  Disposal of assets  1 if the company reports the sale of assets during the year to increase cash flow 
    
  Cost Reduction Strategy   
  Reduce or delay expenditures  1 if the company significantly reduced spending or reports significant employee layoffs during the year to 
increase cash flow  
    
  Commercial Strategy   
  Increase marketing efforts  1 if the company reports increased advertising, increased direct sales efforts, or changes in marketing 
programs during the year 
    
  Product & Process Improvement Strategy   
  Technological and/or product upgrading  1 if the company reports improvements to existing products and/or production processes during the year 
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Strategic Turnaround Initiatives    
    
  Cooperation strategy   
  Long-term contractual agreements   1 if the company engages into one of the following activities during the year under audit: 
-  closing long-term contracts with buyers or suppliers during the year 
-  entering into new joint ventures and strategic alliances  
-  entering into new licensing contracts  
-  entering into contracts for components, subassemblies and products  
-  entering into new contracts with distributors 
    
  Product Innovation Strategy   
  Introduction of new products   1 if he company reports the introduction of new products during the year under audit 
    
  Expansion Strategy   
  Mergers and acquisitions  1 if the company reports horizontal mergers and acquisitions during the year under audit 
  